2024 You Don’t Need an Invoice, Do You? An Online Experiment on Collaborative Tax Evasion
Journal of Economic Psychology 2024, 102708 (LILITH BURGSTALLER and KATHARINA PFEIL)
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Understanding individual decision-making to inform policy making Behavioral Economics
In economics, most approaches to analyzing behavior have traditionally been based on the standard neoclassical economic model of behavior, in which an individual is assumed to be a fully rational, self-controlled, and utility-maximizing decisionmaker.
However, it is increasingly recognized that individuals do not always behave in ways that are consistent with this standard model. Behavioral economics applies methods and evidence from other social sciences such as psychology to study economic decisions and behavior. This approach is based on the belief that increasing the realism with which individual behavior is seen will improve the ability to devise effective policies.
Our team uses administrative data, field and laboratory experiments, as well as surveys to understand economic decision-making. In particular, we investigate determinants of tax evasion, the effects of tax audits and other behavioral interventions to increase compliance, and behavioral responses to complexity in tax law.
Behavioral Economics Projects
You Don’t Need an Invoice, Do You? An Online Experiment on Collaborative Tax Evasion
supported by the Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (GfeW) and the Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft at the University of Freiburg
LILITH BURGSTALLER and KATHARINA PFEIL
Behavioural Responses to Unfair Institutions: Experimental Evidence on Rule Compliance, Norm Polarisation, and Trust
Supported by the Kuratorium Freiburger Schule / Forum Ordnungspolitik
SIMON COLUMBUS, LARS P. FELD, MATTHIAS KASPER and MATTHEW D. RABLEN
Fiscal Literacy, Economic Attitudes and Preferences
Supported by the Kuratorium Freiburger Schule / Forum Ordnungspolitik
LILITH BURGSTALLER, ARRITA DOMI, AMANDA MÄRZ and MATTHIAS KASPER
You’ve Got Mail: The Specific Deterrence Implications of Increased Reliance on Correspondence Audits
SEBASTIAN BEER, BRIAN ERARD, MATTHIAS KASPER and ERICH KIRCHLER
Tax Morale and Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis
YUVAL FELDMAN, YONI SLATER, EWOUT MEIJER and MATTHIAS KASPER
Improving Honesty in an Honor System – a Field Experiment
ROBERT BÖHM, MARINA GROSS, MATTHIAS KASPER and QUINYU XIAO
Incentives, Fines, and Social Norms – An Online Experiment
Supported by the Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft at the University of Freiburg
MATTHIAS KASPER, AMANDA MÄRZ and SARAH NECKER
Speaking Up Against Tax Evasion in a High-Evasion Environment? Why Whistleblowing May Not be the Solution in Collaborative Settings
supported by the Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft at the University of Freiburg
LILITH BURGSTALLER und KATHARINA PFEIL
Incentives for Consumers to Act as Tax Auditors: (When) Are They Effective?
supported by the Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft at the University of Freiburg and the IREF
LILITH BURGSTALLER, ANNABELLE DOERR and SARAH NECKER
